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Abstract
Mixup — a neural network regularization technique
based on linear interpolation of labeled sample pairs —
has stood out by its capacity to improve models robustness
and generalizability through a surprisingly simple formal-
ism. However, its extension to the field of object detection
remains unclear as the interpolation of bounding boxes can-
not be naively defined. In this paper, we propose to lever-
age the inherent region mapping structure of anchors to in-
troduce a mixup-driven training regularization for region
proposal based object detectors. The proposed method is
benchmarked on standard datasets with challenging detec-
tion settings. Our experiments show enhanced robustness to
image alterations along with an ability to decontextualize
detections, resulting in an improved generalization power.
1. Introduction
A major upturn in computer vision has come with the
bloom of deep learning. In particular, convolutional neural
networks (CNNs) [5, 15, 16, 19, 32, 33] have demonstrated
their capacity to learn discriminative visual features, and
have allowed tremendous progress in tasks such as image
classification.
The object detection task naturally extends image clas-
sification by introducing the concept of location. Given an
image, we aim at spatially delimiting all object instances of
interest before classifying them among a finite set of cat-
egories. The difficulty of such task arises from the diver-
sity of possible viewpoints, occlusions, positions and light-
ing conditions which challenges the robustness of proposed
methods. Deep learning-based object detectors [23, 27, 29]
have greatly contributed to overcome these limitations and
obtain state-of-the-art performance [1, 44]. They are con-
sequently used in a wide range of real-world applications
today.
Both classification and detection tasks are usually formu-
lated as supervised learning problems where the objective is
to minimize the prediction error of the model on a dataset
of fully annotated images. The image distribution in the
Figure 1. The mix between two sets of bounding boxes cannot
be trivially defined, as their number, location and labels are not
necessarily comparable.
dataset may strongly affect the model performance [3, 17].
High-density areas of the dataset can be thought of as well-
populated clusters in the image space, likely to convey spa-
tially uniform information and to produce consistent predic-
tions of the model. On the contrary, low-density areas, i.e.
underrepresented areas of the image space, are regions one
has poor knowledge of. A classification decision boundary
should intuitively lie in a low-density area, away from dense
clusters [20]. But it should also tread lightly in such area,
in accordance with the lack of data. Bafflingly, deep classi-
fication networks tend on the contrary to present irregularly
sharp decision boundaries, which are dangerously close to
high-density regions [36, 37].
Adversarial attacks are maliciously crafted signal pertur-
bation which can purposely sway the output of the network
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while being imperceptible to humans [13]. They point out
how skillfully designed noise can exploit the model’s lack
of regularity, even at a pixel-wise scale.
In this regard, object detection flaws are dual [42]: not
only classification but also localization can suffer from an
untrustworthy learned distribution. This is particularly crit-
ical in applications such as self-driving cars or surveillance.
Beyond image-level adversarial attacks [38, 39], detectors
are also vulnerable to transplantation of image parts, re-
ferred to as patching. They can trigger misdetection, even
away from the patch. The patch can be tricked to interfere
with the prediction [21, 24], but more interestingly, even
naive patching has been found to harm detectors [30]. Fur-
thermore, the latter has inspired several data augmentation
strategies [8, 9, 12, 35].
The work by Zhang et al. [41] introduces a training reg-
ularization method called mixup. It extends the representa-
tion of the dataset by linearly interpolating samples along
with their labels. Doing so, one is actually able to miti-
gate the neural network’s degree of extrapolation with re-
spect to our actual knowledge of data in the low-density
regions of the dataset with elegant simplicity and no ad-
ditional inference time. It has already proven its ability to
improve the model’s robustness and generalization power
on a colorful range of tasks such as supervised and semi-
supervised image classification [2, 41], text and acoustic
scene classification [14, 40] as well as medical image seg-
mentation [10]. However, while mixing up labels comes in
naturally through the convex combination of their one-hot
representation, this operation is less obvious when it comes
to bounding boxes as depicted in Figure 1.
In region-based detectors [23, 27, 29], a predefined set
of boxes called anchors constitutes a comprehensive tiling
of possible object locations over the image. The role of
the neural network is then to provide a classification score
and coordinates regression over each anchor. Leveraging
the comprehensiveness assumption of such regions map-
ping, we propose in this paper a simple and general method
to perform mixup-regularized training on region proposal
based object detectors. Consistently with the behavior
of mixup-trained classification networks, we find the pro-
posed solution to outperform baseline models on Pascal
VOC [11] and MS COCO [22] datasets, but most impor-
tantly to demonstrate evidence of enhanced robustness.
The contributions of this paper are threefold: (i) we pro-
vide insights on mixup-based training approaches to high-
light how object detectors could benefit from them; (ii) we
propose a general method to adapt mixup to region proposal
based detectors; (iii) we verify the proposed strategy ef-
fectiveness with extensive experiments on the Single Shot
Multibox Detector (SSD) meta-architecture [23] and show
extended generalization capabilities.
2. Related work
2.1. Mixup Regularized Training for Classification
In the case of a supervised classification problem, let
x, x′ be two independent data samples labeled with y, y′,
respectively. Let λ ∈ [0, 1] be a mixing weight and x˜ =
λx + (1 − λ)x′ the mixed sample with label y˜. While y˜
could be any combination of y and y′, in the interest of
a regularized learning at x˜, the natural choice of setting
y˜ = λy + (1− λ)y′ appears to be supported by several ob-
servations. Firstly, according to Occam’s razor [41], with-
out further constraints on y˜, one should aim for the plainest
solution. This choice also smoothens the model by fostering
a linear behavior in-between training samples, consistently
with the smoothness assumption [4]. Finally, from an in-
formation theory perspective, we have by linearity of the
expectancy:
H(y˜) = Eλy+(1−λ)y′ [− log y˜] (1)
= λH(y, y˜) + (1− λ)H(y′, y˜) (2)
H denoting entropy or cross-entropy when appropriate. The
amount of information endowed to y˜ is hence exactly a con-
vex combination of “what do we know about y˜ from the
perspective of y and y′”.
A typical choice is to let the mixing ratio λ follow a
Beta(α, α) distribution with α > 0. This distribution can
be thought of as a prior over a fair heads or tails game. As
depicted in Figure 2, the greater alpha is, the more blended
pairs of images are.
Mixup hence introduces very little computational cost
and is shown to consistently improve image classification
models across datasets. It favors robustness by, on the one
hand, leading to smoother decision boundaries lying in low-
density areas [41], and on the other hand, enabling compres-
sion of class-specific representations [36].
2.2. Object Detection and Mixup
Zhang et al. [43] propose a visually coherent mixing
strategy for object detection. Mixed images are obtained by
geometry preserving alignment and standard pixel-wise in-
terpolation. Bounding boxes are simply stacked to simulate
object’s co-occurrence and help the model deal with com-
plex settings such as occlusion and image perturbation. The
mixing ratio hyperparameter α is set to be greater than 1 to
obtain a mixed image visually consistent with all bounding
boxes.
Motivated by Rosenfeld et al. [30], they demonstrate the
effectiveness of their approach on the YOLOv3 [28] model
by trying to detect a transplanted elephant patch on an in-
door image. While their baseline model struggles due to
a challenging and incongruous setting for an elephant, the
mix-trained model appears to be less affected by the con-
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Figure 2. Visual comparison of different random mixing weight
distributions. On the left, for α < 1, the probability density func-
tion is such that most drawn λ are close to 0 or 1, resulting in a
lightly noised image. On the right, α > 1 gives a probability den-
sity function such that most random mixing weights λ are near 0.5,
producing a mixed image close to the ”average” image, allowing
both images to be effectively visible.
text. It shows greater recall on the elephant and reinforced
robustness to this perturbation.
However, whereas a linear relationship holds in mixup
between the input and the supervision signal, the mixed set
of bounding boxes used in [43] is independent of the mix-
ing ratio. Naively stacking bounding boxes hence allegedly
strips the mixup procedure from enforcing smoothness.
3. Method
Let X ,Y respectively denote the samples and targets
space, where X ⊆ Rd, and D ∈ (X × Y)n an identi-
cally and independently distributed dataset inducing an em-
pirical joint probability distribution PD over X × Y . Let
fθ = X → Y be our parametrized neural network hypothe-
sis and ` some non-negative differentiable training criterion.
When addressing a classification problem over C
possible classes, the label space is Y = Mult(C),
where Mult(C) denotes multinomial distributions over
{1, . . . , C}, and ` would typically be a cross-entropy. As
proposed by Zhang et al. [41], the mixup classification
problem simplifies to the minimization of the expected risk:
R(θ) = E[`(fθ(λx+ (1− λ)x′), λy + (1− λ)y′)], (3)
where (x, y), (x′, y′) ∼ PD and λ ∼ Beta(α, α).
When it comes to object detection, each element of Y is
composed of one or multiple labeled boxes and one cannot
naively interpolate different sets of bounding boxes as the
latter are not trivially comparable.
Region proposal based object detectors such as Faster-
RCNN [29], SSD [23] or YOLO [27] allow a CNN to cast
the detection problem as multiple classification and regres-
sion problems over a set of predefined regions called an-
chors [29]. Those anchors are meant to constitute a com-
prehensive multi-scale discrete tiling of possible object lo-
cations across the image. A first part of the model, called
region proposal network (RPN), predicts a probability dis-
tribution over classes — augmented with the background
class — and four refining coordinates offsets for each an-
chor.
Each anchor being defined by its center coordinates and
dimensions, let A ⊂ R4 denote this finite prior anchor set.
We introduce the anchor representation space:
Γ(A) = (R4• ×Mult(C))|A|, (4)
where Mult(C) stands for classification distributions over
background and object labels, and R4• = R4 ∪ {∅} stands
for offsets between box coordinates. The symbol ∅ repre-
sents an undefined offset, as explained below.
The RPN is here an application fθ = X → Γ(A) pre-
dicting over each anchor a ∈ A a coordinates offset vector
δˆa ∈ R4 and a label pˆa ∈ Mult(C).
We also define a matching strategy to associate ground
truth bounding boxes to one or more of these anchors, thus
enabling comparison with the prediction. This matching
strategy standardly uses the Intersection-over-Union (IoU)
kernel to compare bounding boxes given a similarity thresh-
old. Formally, we assign each anchor a ∈ A a ground truth
offset vector δa ∈ R4• and a label pa ∈ Mult(C). If a
is matched to some ground truth box b, i.e. if IoU(a, b) is
greater than a given threshold τ , we set δa to the coordinates
difference between a and b and pa to the ground truth label.
Otherwise, pa is set to the background label and δa = ∅.
By using this matching strategy, we can translate ground
truth bounding boxes y ∈ Y into a family {(δa, pa)}a∈A ∈
Γ(A) where each anchor is tied to its own probability dis-
tribution and regression coordinates. We embody it by the
matching operator M = Y → Γ(A).
Assuming the comprehensiveness of regions coverage by
anchors, Γ(A) constitutes a proper representation space for
bounding boxes, embedding both localization and classifi-
cation information. Driven by this observation, we propose
the following mixing strategy depicted in Figure 3.
We consider a pair of images x, x′ with respective sets
of bounding boxes y, y′, and a random mixing weight λ ∼
Beta(α, α). As usual, we use standard linear interpolation
to define the mixed image and predict:
fθ(λx+ (1− λ)x′) = {(δˆa, pˆa)}a∈A. (5)
However, instead of naively mixing y and y′, we pro-
pose to mix their matched anchor representations, namely
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Figure 3. Our method for mixing bounding boxes. Ground truth bounding boxes are matched to multiscale anchors meeting a sufficient
overlap criterion. Three illustrative anchor grids are represented, the smallest corresponding to greater scale anchors. Dark cells are left
unmatched and assigned the background label, blue cells are matched with dog bounding boxes and yellow cells to the airplane bounding
box. Images are mixed pixel-wise and anchor grids blended anchor-wise to obtain the mixed image anchor representation.
M(y) = {(δa, pa)}a∈A and M(y′) = {(δ′a, p′a)}a∈A. To
do that, let’s define by BoxMixλ the desired stochastic mix-
ing operator such that:
BoxMixλ(y, y
′) = {(δ˜a, p˜a)}a∈A. (6)
As it does intuitively make little sense to mix offsets, we
decide to simply define δ˜a as the offset from the dominant
image, i.e. with greater mixing ratio, as:
δ˜a =
{
δa if λ > 12 ,
δ′a otherwise.
(7)
On the other hand, inspired by classification mixup, we
propose to perform linear interpolation on anchor labels and
set:
p˜a = λpa + (1− λ)p′a (8)
By reproducing classification mixup anchor-wise, we
thus build an explicit interpolation map of each singular an-
chor probability distribution.
The latter can eventually be fed to the RPN standard ro-
bust regression and classification losses as:
Lreg(δ˜a, δˆa) = 1{δ˜a 6=∅} smoothL1(δ˜a − δˆa) (9)
Lcls(p˜a, pˆa) = Ep˜a [− log pˆa] (10)
Drawing a parallel with Equation 3, we formulate the
region based object detection mixup problem as the mini-
mization of the following expected risk:
R(θ) = E[`(fθ(λx+ (1− λ)x′),BoxMixλ(y, y′))], (11)
where ` accounts for the anchors sampling strategy and both
regression and classification losses.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental and Implementation Details
The SSD [23] meta-architecture is used in all experi-
ments as a representative of region proposal based detectors.
We use an ImageNet [7] pretrained ResNet-50 [15] back-
bone, whose pooling architecture naturally extracts multi-
scale feature representations. We then map these feature
representations to judiciously dimensioned anchors by fol-
lowing recommendations of [6]. As for the training crite-
rion, we stick with Liu et al. [23] original procedure and
perform hard negative mining to feed standard robust re-
gression loss and classification cross-entropy.
We experiment on both PASCAL VOC [11] and MS-
COCO datasets [22]. For VOC, training is performed on
standard 07 or 07+12 trainval union consisting of 16k
images for 20 classes, and evaluate on the 5k images of
the VOC07 test set. MS-COCO is split into 115k im-
ages (train-2017) for training and 5k images for vali-
dation (val-2017) with 80 object classes. Reported re-
sults follow usual challenge conventions, and unless speci-
fied otherwise, mean Average Precision (mAP) is computed
for 0.5 IoU threshold.
As mixup endeavors lower gradient norms [41], we
opt for an adaptative optimizer and train all models with
Adam [18]. A base learning rate of 3e-4, with 0.9 momen-
tum and 5e-4 weight decay are used. The learning rate is
decayed at the end of each epoch by factor 0.95. We use
a batch size of 32. All images are normalized, resized to
300×300 and undergo the following data augmentation pro-
cedure: random horizontal flips, color jittering and random
cropping.
The matching strategy threshold τ is set to 0.5 and each
groundtruth box must be matched to at least one anchor.
Regarding post-processing, we use the default 0.45 non-
maximal-suppression [25] threshold as suggested by Liu et
al. [23] and keep the top 200 detections at most. Visual-
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Figure 4. Detection examples from VOC07 test set, best viewed in color. 1st row: mixup enhances recall and confidence but yields false
positives. For example, a bird is confused for an airplane. 2nd-3rd row: mixup helps with occlusion and detection of multiple contingent
objects. 4th row: example of greater confidence over small objects detection, at risk of degrading precision.
Train set Method mAP aero bike bird boat bottle bus car cat chair cow table dog horse mbike person plant sheep sofa train tv
07
Baseline 66.2±0.4 81.9 77.8 81.4 66.5 50.3 55.5 75.9 72.6 51.4 63.3 40.0 65.8 74.6 66.7 81.1 60.1 75.4 42.8 77.6 63.8
BoxStack [43] 62.1±0.7 80.8 75.7 77.0 55.5 51.4 53.0 76.5 65.0 49.9 55.1 29.5 55.3 73.2 65.2 79.2 56.6 67.4 42.7 73.2 59.9
Mixup 68.0±0.1 83.6 77.2 82.8 65.6 52.2 59.3 77.5 76.5 54.8 67.1 38.8 67.7 77.5 65.0 81.7 62.6 78.0 47.5 80.1 64.9
07+12
Baseline 72.5±0.1 85.5 81.9 86.4 72.7 54.0 65.8 80.5 79.6 59.2 72.6 49.7 73.7 77.1 74.3 84.4 65.8 81.1 55.8 82.7 66.5
BoxStack [43] 68.2±0.5 83.8 79.5 83.6 65.8 53.1 63.0 79.2 73.4 56.9 65.7 39.6 65.6 73.7 73.7 81.8 61.3 75.0 48.4 78.9 64.1
Mixup 73.1±0.2 87.2 82.6 87.7 74.5 53.7 66.6 81.3 81.4 60.4 75.5 47.2 74.5 77.5 72.5 84.6 64.8 81.0 55.4 83.8 68.0
Table 1. PASCAL VOC07 test detection results; ”Baseline”: standard SSD training; ”BoxStack”: our re-implementation of bounding
boxes stacking from [43]; ”Mixup”: our object detection strategy. The results are averaged over 5 independently trained models.
Method AP[0.5:0.95] AP50 AP75 APS APM APL AR1 AR10 AR100 ARS ARM ARL
Baseline 19.7 33.7 20.3 3.7 20.4 34.6 19.2 26.2 26.9 5.0 27.1 47.4
BoxStack [43] 15.6 28.5 15.4 2.4 17.0 27.4 16.7 23.4 24.3 3.7 24.8 41.9
Mixup 19.5 34.3 19.7 3.5 20.7 33.9 19.6 27.9 29.2 6.1 30.5 49.1
Table 2. MS-COCO val-2017 detection results; Methods naming is similar to Table 1.
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Figure 5. Example of detections on an image corrupted with Gaussian noise for baseline and mixup models. Predictions are initially
more accurate for the mixup model with better recall. Low-corruption (σ = 0.1) undermines predictions confidence without significantly
degrading overall detections for both. Mixup is more resistant to greater corruption (σ = 0.4), maintaining a reasonable recall although
inaccurate detections start to appear.
izations are produced by additionally discarding proposals
with a score lower than some given threshold, typically 0.3.
Our code is implemented in PyTorch [26] and ran on an
Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080.
4.2. Mixed Detection Results
We compare the baseline SSD model against our mixup
model and our re-implementation of naive bounding boxes
stacking [43]. We report results in Tables 1 and 2. For
fair comparison, the baseline model follows exactly the
same implementation and training procedure as the pro-
posed method. To comply with visual coherence, we use
α = 1.5 in our re-implementation of [43], but discard ge-
ometry preserving alignment and simply mix images by
resizing them to the same size. For our model, we find
α = 0.2 to give the desired mixing ratio distribution. In
practice, mixed images are hence simply noised as illus-
trated in Figure 2. Yet, one could argue that the mixup noise
is crafted to follow a distribution proportional to the dataset
empirical distribution. In the same way, adversarial attacks
consist of noises distorted to sway predictions.
Overall, as for classification, mixup consistently im-
proves mAP. As shown in Figure 4, mixup helps the model
dealing with object multiplicity and contingency, leading
thus to enhanced recall power. Moreover, whereas in clas-
sification mixup did soothe the model’s over-confidence, in
our case it turns out to foster confident predictions. While
confident detection is a desired behavior, it also tends to oc-
casionally be counterproductive, undermining its precision
by clumsily ”overachieving” detection. A judicious tuning
of proposal filtering is thus required.
Although we believe to have rigorously reproduced the
box stacking experiment of [43] but for image alignment,
we are surprised to notice it actually drastically hurts per-
formances. Overmixing samples and never showing realis-
tic images to the model could hamper regularization by in-
troducing more confusion than it should. Indeed, in image
classification, large values of α are found to lead to under-
fitting [41], which could explain our observation.
4.3. Robustness and Enhanced Recall
To shed light on the models reinforced robustness, we
conduct two experiments to assess its resilience to pertur-
bations.
First, to simulate situations where the image quality is
corrupted, we compare baseline and mixup models mAP
when evaluated on noisy data. We set the noise to fol-
low a centered Gaussian distribution with standard devia-
tion σ. The mAP is then computed in a low- (σ = 0.1),
intermediate- (σ = 0.2) and high-corruption setting (σ =
0.4). As reported in Table 3, the mixup model globally
demonstrates a greater tolerance to noise. Interestingly,
when noise intensifies, i.e. we get further away from real
data points, the mixup trained model shows a greater rela-
tive performance. It suggests that mixup helps indeed with
learning out of the dataset distribution.
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Figure 6. Examples of detection on patched images for baseline and mixup models; (a) the indoor context leads the baseline to mistake a
cow for a dog; (b) the motorcyle is not detected due to incongruous context; (c) the patch provokes non-local alteration by discarding boat
detection.
σ 0 0.1 0.2 0.4
Baseline 72.5±0.1 70.3±0.2 65.7±0.6 54.3±0.6
Mixup 73.1±0.2 71.6±0.4 68.1±0.5 58.6±1.2
Difference 0.6±0.2 1.3±0.5 2.4±0.9 4.3±1.7
Table 3. Comparison of noise tolerance in the mAP. Models
are trained on VOC07+12 trainval and evaluated on noised
VOC07 test data for several noise intensity. The gap seems to
grow with σ in favor of the mixup model, suggesting that the nois-
ier an image is, the more relevant it is to use mixup.
Secondly, following the footsteps of Rosenfeld et
al. [30], we design an experiment to challenge its contex-
tual reasoning and ability to cope with image transplanta-
tion. We collect three different open source clipped images
for each of the 20 classes in PASCAL VOC by typing the
class labels in a search engine and randomly selecting 3
PNG images with a transparent background. Then, for each
image in the VOC07 test, we successively randomly draw
a patch among collected images, apply scale preserving re-
sizing to the patch so that it randomly occupies between
10 and 40% of the image size, and paste it at a random
location. By repeating this operation on five independent
copies of the evaluation set — summing up to a total of
24720 examples — we expect the so patched images to be
on average unrelated to their surrounding. We then com-
pare the baseline and mixup model on two criteria: on the
one hand, detection of the transplanted patches only, which
measures the ability to predict regardless of context. On the
other hand, we also compute the overall mAP on these al-
tered datasets, which indicates how resilient the model is to
patching induced perturbations [30]. Indeed, as plotted in
Figure 6, we observe image transplantation has multiple ef-
fects on detectors beyond occasional occlusion by the patch.
Detectors happen to become very unstable in their predic-
tions, with volatile confidence levels causing patches, but
also other objects in the image, to be undetected or misde-
tected. Besides, as supported by Rosenfeld et al. [30], these
effects also occur remotely from the patch and are highly
dependent on the patch nature and location.
IoU threshold 0.50 0.75
Model Baseline Mixup Baseline Mixup
Patches Detected 8329 11693 5201 8340
Patch Precision(%) 76.0 78.3 82.5 79.9
Patch Recall(%) 33.7 47.4 20.9 33.7
mAP (all objects) 50.3 51.5 49.1 50.7
Table 4. Comparison of performance on random patches detec-
tion and patched images detection. Scores are averaged across
classes on 5 copies of VOC07 test set. Models are trained on
VOC07+12 trainval. The IoU threshold corresponds to the
bounding boxes matching criterion, 0.75 being stricter than 0.50.
Table 4 shows results for default (τ = 0.5) and a stricter
(τ = 0.75) matching threshold. Mixup turns out to signifi-
cantly improve patches recall, detecting roughly 50% more
patches than our baseline. It emphasizes a bolstered ability
to reason independently from context. Although we notice
precision on patches detection to be mitigated when using
a stricter IoU criterion, the mAP is still greater by a margin
consistent with the one we obtain in Table 1. It suggests an
effective improvement of the detector’s robustness.
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4.4. Regularization Analysis by Anchor Level
One of the mechanisms behind the success of mixup in
classification is its ability to compress class-specific repre-
sentations into manifolds with lower dimensionality [36].
This is an important underlying process of generaliza-
tion [31, 34], referred to as flattening. In their experiments,
Verma et al. [36] take classification mixup one step further
and propose to not only interpolate samples and labels but
also hidden representations. Although they point out mixup
does not always enforce class compression, their method
succeeds at this task. They provide theoretical evidence
of flattening and empirically demonstrate it by computing
the singular value decomposition of class-specific hidden
representations. Small singular values for models trained
with their approach were consistently reduced, resulting in
greater explained variability by the main singular compo-
nent.
Inspired by this experiment, we conduct a similar study.
By consenting to some degree of approximation, we gather
batches of images from VOC07 test according to their
most frequent instance-level label, which can be thought of
as image-level labeling. We then extract image-level spe-
cific representations for baseline and mixup models, by re-
trieving the penultimate classification hidden representation
of the detector, i.e. logits on all anchors. As for the SSD
with 300×300 input size, the latter can be split into six parts
A1, . . . ,A6 sorted by increasing anchor scales. We then
compute, for each image-level representation, the variance
explained by the first principal component analysis (PCA)
direction.
Figure 7. Difference in explained variance by the first PCA compo-
nent of image-level specific hidden representation between mixup
and baseline models, at multiple anchor scales; plotted for 2 vehi-
cle (blue), animal (green) and household (red) classes. A higher
bar means a flatter representation; ”All classes”: computed for all
classes merged together. Consistently with [36], the trend is only
image-level specific and not verified for all images together. It
confirms this experiment highlights a class-specific phenomenon.
Globally, mixup actually seems to scatter variability
through multiple components, playing the flattening counter
game. As depicted in Figure 7, this is particularly true for
large anchors (A4 to A6) where the information is being
washed down by mixup. However, when it comes to the
most granular anchor mapA1, mixup enhances the explain-
ability endowed to the first PCA component consistently
across classes. It hence suggests a lowered variability in
image-level specific representations of small regions.
To further investigate how mixup does not benefit
equally to all anchors, we train six separate models on
VOC07, but each time, only use mixup on a unique anchor
level Ai , i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. To truly single out the mixed
anchors against all others, we emphasize the blending ra-
tio and use α = 0.75 during training. At each iteration,
we hence run a forward pass on both the original and the
mixed batch. The output of the mixed batch forward pass
is then used to backpropagate on Ai logits only, while the
predictions over the original images are used for backprop-
agation on all other anchor maps. Doing so, we double in-
ference cost which causes us to reduce batchsize to 16 due
to memory limitations. Results of Table 4.4 demonstrate
that mixup indeed hurts performance when used on large
anchors whereas scores on smaller objects detections tend
to be marginally greater than the baseline for A1 and A3.
Baseline mAP — 65.2±0.2
Mixed level mAP
A1 65.9±0.1
A2 65.2±0.5
A3 66.5±0.3
Mixed level mAP
A4 64.7±0.2
A5 64.6±0.6
A6 64.8±0.5
Table 5. Evaluation on VOC07 test mixing for a unique anchor
level; Baseline is trained without mixup and batch size 16; ”Mixed
level”: unique anchor map level trained with mixup; left table:
smaller anchors; right table: larger anchors
Knowing that SSD main weakness is small objects de-
tection [23], such regularization could indeed have con-
tributed to its bolstered performance, leading to the overall
improved mAP we obtain in Table 1.
5. Discussion and Future Work
Anchors provide us with a comprehensive representa-
tion of sets of bounding boxes, allowing us to replicate the
mixup regularization anchor-wise and further extend it to
propose a novel general adaptation of Zhang et al. algorithm
to region proposal based detectors. The proposed method
stands out by enhanced robustness and confidence in pre-
dictions at negligible additional computational costs.
We believe the proposed anchor mixing strategy could
be refined to account for different blending procedures re-
garding anchors sizes and better balance the overwhelming
number of background anchors. Such method could then
naturally be extended to use cases such as pseudo-boxes
guessing in a semi-supervised or self-supervised setting, or
help cope with low dataset size or sparse class distribution.
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